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PROVIDING ASSURANCE ON SCANON’S ACCOUNT OF PROMISES

by

HUNTER TYLER THOMSEN

Under The Direction of Christy Hartley, PhD

ABSTRACT
Thomas Scanlon provides a theory of why we ought to keep our promises according to which the
wrong of breaking a promise is a moral wrong that does not depend on any social practice.
Instead a promise provides a recipient with assurance and the value of assurance establishes a
moral obligation to keep our promises. However, it is often charged that theories like Scanlon’s
are untenable because they are subject to a vicious circularity. I address some recent critics of
Scanlon’s theory, all of whom maintain that his account does not adequately show how a
promise provides assurance and therefore does not overcome the charge of circularity in
explaining why we are obligated to keep our promises. I revise Scanlon’s theory and show how
a promise can provide a recipient with assurance, demonstrating that Scanlon’s account is a
tenable theory of why we have an obligation to keep our promises.
INDEX WORDS: Promises, Promissory obligation, Contractualism, Scanlon
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1. Introduction1
We typically agree that we have an obligation to keep our promises. However, there is
much disagreement about why we have this obligation. The more received view is that the
obligation to keep a promise depends essentially on the existence of a conventional norm or
social practice of agreement making. When someone makes a promise, on this view, members
of society have certain expectations and intentions, and accept certain norms regarding the
promisor’s conduct. Given this societal practice, the promise enables the promisor and the
promisee to enter into a stable kind of agreement. The wrong involved in breaking a promise
then derives from the fact that this social practice or conventional of agreement making allows
the members of society to enter into these stable agreements in pursuing their aims and interests,
and is therefore to everyone’s benefit or advantage.2
On T.M. Scanlon’s view, however, this practice-based view fails to capture what is most
important about the obligation to keep a promise: “Unlike an obligation to comply with a just
institution that provides some of the public goods, the obligation to keep a promise is owed to a
specific individual.”3 In breaking a promise, that is to say, one does not just do something
wrong, but does something wrong to the person to whom the promise was made. What seems
significant about the obligation to keep a promise, then, is not the advantage keeping promises
has for everyone in society, but the fact that in breaking a promise we do something wrong to the
person the promise was made to. Thus, while a social practice or conventional norm may play
1

Throughout the paper I use the masculine pronoun to refer to the promisor, or speaker, and the feminine pronoun to
refer to the promisee, or recipient of the speaker’s promise.
2
Though views of this kind differ in a number ways from how I have described it here, theories with the basic claim
that promissory obligation depends essentially on a social practice or conventional norm can be found in: David
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D. Norton & M. Norton (Oxford University Press, 2000), 331-7, John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971), 344-50, Joseph Raz, “Voluntary Obligations and
Normative Powers,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, Vol. 46 (1972), 79-102, G.E.M.
Anscombe, “Rules, rights, and promises,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1978), 318-23, H.L.A Hart, The
Concept of Law, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 43-4, 225.
3
Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), 316.
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some role in how we make promises, Scanlon argues that the obligation to keep a promise does
not at all depend on the existence of any social practice or conventional norm. A promise, on
Scanlon’s view, provides a recipient with assurance, and the value of this assurance is sufficient
to establish a moral obligation to keep our promises.4
Theories of promissory obligation like the one Scanlon advances, however, which do not
appeal to any social practice or conventional norm, but maintain that the wrong of not fulfilling a
promise is a moral wrong, are often thought to be untenable. Specifically, such accounts are
thought to be subject to a vicious circularity.5 Scanlon presents a way of dealing with the charge
of circularity, but his argument has been subject to many criticisms. My aim in this paper is to
address these criticisms, and to revise Scanlon’s view. Specifically, I will argue that although
Scanlon’s account of promising, as it stands, is problematic, it can be defended by taking into
consideration the promisor’s moral regard for the promisee’s expectation.
In the second chapter I will present Scanlon’s account, and his response to the charge of
circularity. In the third chapter, I will present three criticisms of Scanlon’s response. Central to
each criticism is that Scanlon does not show why we are obligated to keep our promises because
a promise as he interprets it cannot provide a recipient with the appropriate assurance. Then, in
the fourth chapter, I will present another way that we can interpret a promise on Scanlon’s
account, and I will argue that on my interpretation a promise can provide a recipient with the
appropriate kind of assurance. In the fifth chapter I will show how my interpretation of a
promise addresses the specific criticisms from the third chapter, and I will then conclude in the
4

The main works of Scanlon’s that I draw on in this paper are Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
(Harvard University Press, 1998), and Thomas Scanlon, “Promises and Contracts,” in The Theory of Contract Law,
Edited by Peter Benson, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 86-117.
5
This charge is stated in H.A. Prichard, “The Obligation to Keep a Promise” in Moral Writings, edited by Jim
MacAdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002), 257–266, Michael Robbins, “The Primacy of Promising,” Mind, Vol. 85
No. 339 (1976), 321-340, G.E.M. Anscombe, “Rules, Rights, and Promises,” in Ethics, Religion, and Politics:
Collected Philosophical Papers, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 97-103, and Michael Pratt,
“Scanlon on Promising,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 14 No. 1 (January 2001), 143-154.
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sixth chapter that Scanlon’s theory is a tenable way of explaining why we have an obligation to
keep our promises.6
2. Scanlon’s Account
On Scanlon’s view, the wrong involved in not fulfilling a promise is an instance of a
more general class of moral wrongs concerning what we owe to those whom we’ve led to form
certain expectations about our future conduct.7 Scanlon then argues that cases of promising are
distinguished from other wrongs in this class in two respects.
First, promises are meant to provide a recipient with assurance: they are meant to enable
a recipient to be “reasonably certain that a thing will happen unless she consents to it not
happening.”8 To illustrate, suppose that my younger brother and I are traveling abroad on our
own for seven days. Before we are about to get on the plane my mother says to me, “Promise
that you’ll look out for your brother, and won’t leave him wandering off alone,” to which I
respond, “I promise.” What my mother desires here is to be reasonably certain that while we’re
abroad I will look out for my brother. And my promise enables her to be reasonable certain that I
will do as she is asking. That is to say, my promise provides her with assurance: it enables her
to be reasonably certain that things are going to go a certain way—the way that I’ve promised
her they will.
The obligation to keep our promises, then, derives from the considerable reasons we have
for valuing the assurance that a promise provides. Specifically, there are strong general reasons
to value the assurance of a promise, not simply because we have reason to want to be in a

6

I should perhaps emphasize that the main aim of this paper is to work within Scanlon’s Contractualist moral theory
to show how this theory can give an appropriate account of why we have a moral obligation to keep our promises.
My arguments to show how a promise provides assurance thus makes use of Scanlon’s Contractualist moral theory.
7
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 296.
8
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 316.
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reasonably confident state of mind, but primarily because we have considerable reasons to want
certain things to actually happen.9 When my mother asks me to promise to look out for my
younger brother, what she has good reason to want is not just peace of mind or freedom from
worry, but certain things to actually transpire—that her son will be watched out for so that no
preventable harm or trouble will come to him while he is abroad. In other words, she has good
reason to want it to be the case that I will watch out for my younger brother. The reasons my
mother has illustrates the general kinds of reasons expressed in what Scanlon calls the value of
assurance: “What you have reason to want is not mere peace of mind of believing that [things
will go a certain way]; rather you have reason to want these things actually to be the case. What
I am calling the value of assurance reflects reasons of both of these kinds, but it is the latter that
are primary.”10 In essence, the value of assurance is the strong interest we have in being able to
be reasonably certain that things are going to happen unless we consent to their not happening,
and the reason we have for valuing this assurance is not just because we want freedom from
stress, but primarily because we have reason to want certain things to actually transpire.11
Given the considerable reasons we have for valuing the assurance a promise provides,
Scanlon argues that it is reasonable to want a principle specifying the obligation to fulfill our
promises. Accordingly, Scanlon formulates the Principle of Fidelity:
If (1) in the absence of objectionable constraint, and with adequate understanding (or the
ability to acquire such understanding) of his or her situation, A intentionally leads B to
expect that A will do X unless B consents to A’s not doing so; (2) A knows that B wants
to be assured of this; (3) A acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and has good
9

Scanlon, “Promises and Contracts,” 95.
Scanlon, “Promises and Contracts,” 95.
11
This interpretation of the value of assurance reflects Scanlon’s abstract account of value (Scanlon, What We Owe
to Each Other, 95-100). I will not discuss it in this paper, but there are some interesting critical discussions of
Scanlon’s conception of assurance. See Richard Parkhill, “Assurance and Scanlon’s Theory of Promises,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol CVIII, Part 3 (2008): 385-392, Nicholas Southwood and Daniel
Friedrich, “Promises Beyond Assurance,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the
Analytic Tradition, Vol. 144, No. 2 (2009): 261-280, and Dennis Patterson, “The Value of a Promise,” Law and
Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1992): 385-402.
10
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reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) B knows that A has the beliefs and
intentions just described; (5) A intends for B to know this, and knows that B does know
it; and (6) B knows that A has this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special
justification, A must do X unless B consents to X’s not being done.12
The Principle of Fidelity on Scanlon’s view is valid—viz. it correctly identifies certain actions as
morally required under certain conditions. Moreover, this principle can be established on
Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory through the ideal of justifiability. On this ideal, an action
is morally required if a principle requiring the action’s performance could not be reasonably
rejected by others concerned to live in accordance with mutually justifiable principles.13 To
determine if a principle can be reasonably rejected, we consider the burdens that would be
imposed on some people if the action were required. To determine if these burdens provide
grounds for reasonably rejecting the principle, we consider the reasons for wanting such a
principle, and compare them against the burdens not having this principle would place on
others.14
Scanlon argues that the reasons we have for valuing assurance are sufficient to establish
that the Principle of Fidelity cannot be reasonably rejected. To avoid the requirement imposed
by the Principle of Fidelity one only needs to make sure to appropriately condition or qualify the
expectation they lead another to have, by saying, for instance, “This is what I intend to do, but I
may change my mind.” Since the burden of qualifying the expectation one leads another to form
is so slight in comparison to the strong interest we have in being provided with assurance, and
given the strong reasons we have for valuing assurance, there are not sufficient grounds to

12

Scanlon, “Promises and Contracts,” 95. The way the Principle Fidelity is stated here is slightly different than how
it is stated in What We Owe to Each Other. The main difference is that Scanlon has added two qualifications to the
first condition. Nothing in this paper depends on this difference. For comparison see Scanlon, What We Owe to
Each Other, 304.
13
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 4-5, 168-9, and 189.
14
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 195, 213.
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reasonable reject the Principle of Fidelity.15 Consequently, when a speaker fulfills the conditions
specified by the Principle of Fidelity, and provides another with assurance that a certain
expectation will be fulfilled, the speaker is morally required to act in the way that will fulfill that
expectation.
Notably, since the Principle of Fidelity is grounded in the value of assurance, its validity
does not depend on their being any conventional norm or social practice of agreement making.
When such practices exist, they may provide one kind of basis for providing assurance; however,
assurance can be provided in many ways, in some instances without uttering the words, “I
promise.”16 This leads to the second way that promises are distinguished from other, related
obligations, which is the way that they provide assurance. Scanlon writes, “When I say, ‘I
promise to help you if you help me,’ the reason that I suggest to you that I will have for helping
is my awareness of the fact that not to return your help would, under the circumstance, be wrong:
not just forbidden by some social practice but morally wrong—disallowed by the kind of moral
reasoning that lies behind [the Principle of Fidelity].”17 That is, in making a promise, the speaker
conveys his awareness that, given the circumstances, it would be morally wrong not to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation, without some justification she can reasonably accept.
A more precise analysis of how a promise provides assurance works as follows. When I
say, “I promise to do X,” I do several things. First, I claim to have a certain intention. Second, I
make this claim with the clear purpose of getting you to believe I have this intention; and the
circumstances in which I do this are such that I’m aware that if you believe I have this intention
then the truth of your belief will be of considerable importance to you. Third, and most
especially, I indicate to you that I believe and take seriously the fact that, once I have declared
15

Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 304-5.
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 306. Scanlon, “Promises and Contracts,” 98.
17
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 306.
16
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this intention under the circumstances, and have reason to believe that you are convinced by it, it
would be wrong of me not to perform the promised action. Specifically, the function of the
expression “I promise” gives the recipient the understanding that the promisor is aware that it
would be morally wrong not to fulfill her expectation, and this provides the recipient with
assurance—it enables the recipient to be reasonably certain that the promisor will fulfill her
expectation, unless she consents to his not fulfilling her expectation.
At this point Scanlon acknowledges that his interpretation of how a promise provides
assurance may seem subject to a charge of vicious circularity, which can be stated as follows.
The speaker provides assurance by conveying his awareness that it would be morally wrong not
to fulfill the recipient’s expectation. However, it seems like it could only be morally wrong not to
fulfill the expectation, if the speaker were morally obligated to fulfill the expectation. A speaker
is only morally obligated to fulfill the recipient’s expectation, however, if he provides assurance:
and the speaker provides assurance by conveying his awareness that it would be morally wrong
not to fulfill the recipient’s expectation.18 This circularity charge thus suggests that Scanlon’s
account does not explain how promises give us obligations—a promisor is obligated to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation because promises provide assurance, but the way a promise provides
assurance seems to presuppose that the promisor is already obligated to fulfill the recipient’s
expectation.
Scanlon responds that this circularity is only apparent if we distinguish between a series
of related moral wrongs. In particular, there is, first, the moral wrong regarding the expectations
that we lead others to form about what we intend to do; specifically, it is the wrong of
convincing another to have a certain expectation, while having no intention to fulfill that

18

Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 307
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expectation. Then, there is a more specific moral wrong of attempting to commit the first wrong;
that is, of attempting to lead another to form a reasonable yet false expectation.19 Given that
there are strong reasons to want to direct our efforts and resources toward aims we have chosen,
and to make or look for opportunities to establish arrangements in pursuit of those aims, we
therefore have strong reasons not to want those plans co-opted or thwarted whenever it is
convenient or suits someone else’s purposes. These reasons are thus sufficient to establish that it
would be morally wrong to negligently or intentionally lead another to form a reasonable yet
false expectation about one’s future conduct, when that expectation is important to that
individual. And, in turn, we can establish that it would be wrong to attempt to do this as well.20
According to Scanlon, it is in virtue of this latter wrong of attempting to lead another to
form a reasonable yet false expectation that a promise provides assurance. Scanlon writes,
If you believe that I take seriously the fact that making such an attempt is wrong, then
you believe that I have a significant reason not to do this. You therefore have reason to
believe that (in the absence of special justifying conditions) I would not attempt to
persuade you that I intend to do a certain thing (when I know that you care about and may
rely upon my doing it) unless I actually had a settled intention to do that thing.21
In making a promise, this is to say, the speaker conveys to the recipient that he takes it to be
morally wrong to lead her to think he intends to do a certain thing without actually having the
settled intention to do that thing. In other words, a promise provides the recipient with the
understanding that the speaker takes it to be morally wrong to lead her to form a false
expectation about how he intends to act. This gives the recipient good reason to believe that the
speaker would not attempt to mislead her in this way, and that he therefore has the settled
intention that will fulfill her expectation. Thus, Scanlon’s account avoids the charge of
circularity since the reason a promise provides assurance is, not because it would be morally
19

Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 306
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 298. Scanlon, “Promises and Contract,” 89 and 93.
21
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 308.
20
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wrong not to fulfill an obligation to fulfill the recipient’s expectation, but because the promisor
knows and takes seriously the moral wrong involved in attempting to lead the recipient to form a
false expectation about how he is intending to act.
3. The Wrong Kind of Assurance
Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise seems to avoid the charge of circularity. However,
it is not clear that a promise on this interpretation can actually provide assurance. Indeed, in this
chapter we’ll see that Michael Pratt,22 Niko Kolodny, R. Jay Wallace,23 and Elinor Mason,24 all
find that a promise, as Scanlon interprets it, cannot enable a recipient to be reasonably certain
that her expectation will be fulfilled unless she consents to its not being fulfilled. In the next
three sections of this chapter I will explicate these author’s critiques of Scanlon’s interpretation
of how a promise provides assurance.
3.1. Michael Pratt
I’ll first present the critique formulated by Michael Pratt. To begin, recall the way a
promise provides assurance on Scanlon’s view: A promise provides the recipient with assurance
by providing her with the understanding that the promisor takes it to be morally wrong to lead
her to think he intends to do a certain thing without actually having the settled intention to do
that thing. Pratt argues that this interpretation of a promise cannot provide assurance because it
does not enable the recipient to have the right kind of understanding about how the promisor is
intending to act. Specifically, a promisor seems to give the recipient good reason to believe that
22

Michael Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (2002): 93-119, Michael Pratt, “Scanlon on Promising,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,
Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2001): 143-154. Pratt’s criticism is also restated by Neal A. Tognazzini, “The Hybrid
Nature of Promissory Obligation,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2007): 203-232.
23
Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace, “Promises and Practices Revisited,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 31,
No. 2 (Spring, 2003): 119-154.
24
Elinor Mason, “We Make No Promises,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 123 (2005): 33-46.
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currently he has an certain intention to act in a particular way, but what reason does she have to
believe that the speaker will adhere to that intention? While the speaker is aware that it would
be wrong to lead the recipient to think he intends to do a certain thing without actually having the
settled intention to do that thing, it’s not clear whether the speaker takes it to be wrong to change
his intention. In particular, the speaker hasn’t provided the recipient with the understanding that
he takes it to be morally wrong to not adhere to that intention without the recipient’s consent, and
thus he has not provided the recipient with assurance. In Pratt’s words, “It does not follow that
the intention of the promisor…is ‘settled’ in the sense that the promisor may not change
his…mind without the consent of the promisee.”25
According to Pratt, the only way for Scanlon’s theory to work is if there is a certain kind
of social practice or conventional norm. To show this, Pratt first draws out what seems to
missing from Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise, which we can illustrate with an example.
Say that Jenny needs a ride home from work tomorrow, and so she asks Tyler if he’d be willing
to do so. Tyler replies by saying, “In all likelihood I’ll be able to give you a ride, and I fully
intend to do so; however, it might be that I will have to leave work early tomorrow, so please
know that I am not entirely committed to giving you a ride home.”26 Let us further assume that
from this statement Jenny has the same understanding that a promise would provide on Scanlon’s
interpretation; that is, we can assume that Jenny has the understanding that Tyler takes it to be
morally wrong to lead her to think he intends to do a certain thing without actually having the
settled intention to do that thing. Accordingly, Jenny can be assured that, at the moment, Tyler
intends to drive her home after work tomorrow.

25
26

Pratt, “Scanlon on Promising,” 153. Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” 106-7.
This example is nearly the same as what Pratt presents in “Promises and Perlocutions,” 107.
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Now, Pratt notes that if Tyler incurs any moral obligation in this case, it cannot be the
one specified by the Principle of Fidelity. Even if we assume that Jenny has the understanding
that Tyler wouldn’t lead her to believe he has a certain intention without actually having that
intention, there would be good reasons for reasonably objecting to the Principle of Fidelity if it
bound Tyler into an obligation to drive her home from work tomorrow, since he has taken
adequate measures to preclude Jenny from being provided assurance.27 But what is it, then, that
is missing from Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise that precludes Jenny from being provided
with assurance? Pratt points out that it must be something about Tyler’s claim that explains why
he is not committed to that intention. That is, what seems to be missing is Jenny’s understanding
that Tyler takes it that, having said he has a settled intention to do a certain thing, he is now
morally required to commit to that intention. More specifically, Pratt claims that what is absent
from Scanlon’s interpretation is the idea that a promise conveys the speaker’s belief that, having
made a promise, and having led the recipient to think he has a certain intention, he now morally
owes it to her to stick with that intention and fulfill her expectation. Thus, in order for the
Principle of Fidelity to be valid it must require a promise to give the recipient the understanding
that the promisor takes it that, having made the promise, he now owes it to the recipient to do as
he said he would.28
It is worth noting that Scanlon may respond Pratt fails to observe the first condition of the
Principle of Fidelity, which requires the speaker to lead the recipient to expect that he will
perform a certain action unless the recipient consents to his not so acting. Scanlon could then
argue that this is why Jenny is precluded from being provided assurance in the example.
However, Pratt responds that in order for the recipient to form this expectation that the speaker
27
28

Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” 104. See also Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 304.
Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” 107-8.
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will perform the promised action unless she consents to his not so acting, she must have the
understanding that the speaker takes himself to morally owe it to her to perform. That is, the
recipient must believe that the speaker takes himself to have a reason for performing the action
that can be extinguished if she consents to the action not being performed. The only plausible
way in which the speaker could have a reason of this sort, however, is where the reason or
requirement derives from the speaker regarding himself as owing that performance to someone.
It is difficult, Pratt claims, to think of another way in which one can have a reason to act a certain
way, but will no longer have this reason if another agrees to the action not being performed.29
What Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise is missing, then, is the idea that a promise
conveys the speaker’s belief that, having led the recipient to think he has a certain intention, he
owes it to the recipient to adhere to that intention; or that he is morally required to carry out that
intention so as to fulfill her expectation. However, Pratt points out that, “in the absence of some
social practice of promise-keeping, a promisee would have no reason to ascribe such a belief to a
promisor.”30 Specifically, in making a promise, and expressing a settled intention to act a certain
way, it’s not clear what could establish that the speaker now morally owes it to the recipient to
fulfill her expectation unless there is a social practice or convention which performed this
function.31
Consequently, if we are to stick with Scanlon’s way of responding to the circularity
charge, and interpret a promise as conveying a speaker’s settled intention to act a certain way,
then in order to explain how a promise can provide assurance we need some way to explain the
speaker’s belief that by making a promise he also morally owes it the recipient to carrying out

29

Pratt, “Promises and Perlociutions,” 109.
Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” 108.
31
Pratt, “Promises and Perlocutions,” 108.
30
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that intention; and to do this it seems like we must appeal to a social practice or conventional
norm which effectively obligates the speaker to adhere to his intention.
3.2. Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace
Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace present a second critique, which voices a similar
concern: that a promise on Scanlon’s interpretation does not give a recipient good reason to
believe the speaker will adhere to his intention. They begin by arguing that the type of reasoning
a recipient must go through shows that it must be the case that the promisor has some compelling
reason for having his intention. In particular, they note that a promise, as Scanlon interprets it,
would seem to provide assurance by enabling the promisee to reason as follows: Since the
promisor would not attempt lead another to form a false expectation about his future conduct, the
promisor must believe that he will fulfill the expectation, and must believe this because he is
intending to act in the way that is expected. 32 As Kolodny and Wallace point out, however, in
order for this to provide assurance it cannot be a mere intention to act as expected. If the
promisor formed a mere intention to do the expected act, without having any compelling reasons,
then there seems to be no reason for the promisor not to revise his intention in the face of some
contrary reason, or some other compelling intention.33 And if this is the case, then it is not clear
that the recipient can be reasonably certain that the speaker will fulfill her expectation.34 Thus, in
order for a promise to enable the recipient to be reasonably certain that the speaker will fulfill the
expectation—in order for her to be provided with assurance—it must be that the speaker has
some compelling reason to fulfill the expectation. In essence, as Kolodny and Wallace write,

32

Kolodny and Wallace, “Promises and Practices Revisited,” 139-140.
Kolodny and Wallace, “Promises and Practices Revisited,” 140.
34
Kolodny and Wallace, “Promises and Practices Revisited,” 141.
33
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“the question is whether [the recipient] has reason to believe that [the speaker’s] present
intention will persist.”35
In particular, for the recipient to be reasonably certain that the speaker’s present intention
will persist, and that he will actually fulfill her expectation, Kolodny and Wallace argue that the
promisor must have either a prior or non-moral practice-based reason for that intention. First,
the speaker’s compelling reason cannot be that, having made a promise and provided the
recipient with assurance, the promisor is obligated by the Principle of Fidelity—this is what
generated the circularity charge.36 Also, we cannot suppose that the speaker’s reason depends on
the existence of a conventional norm or social practice of agreement making, for Scanlon wants
to explicitly deny any such reasons have a necessary role to play in explaining promissory
obligation. This would seem to leave us with the speaker’s having a prior reason to fulfill the
expectation, that is, a reason prior to making the promise, such as it being in his own best
interest. Or the speaker must have a nonmoral practice-based reason, which would be a reason
based on his membership or affiliation with a group, society, or practice. For instance, the
promisor may take his identity and integrity as a member of the Eagle Scouts to require him to
keep his promises.37
If it must be the case that a promisor has a prior or nonmoral practice-based reason in
order to assure the promisee, however, then Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise is seriously
inadequate. The whole point of a promise is that it is supposed to provide the promisor with a
sufficient reason and motivation to fulfill the expectation regardless of whatever other reasons he
may or may not have. Indeed, as Scanlon himself points out, “Typically, a promise is asked for
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or offered when there is doubt as to whether the promiser will a have sufficient motive to do the
thing promised. [And] the point of a promise is to provide such a motive.”38 The vital function
of a promise, in other words, is to supply the speaker with a reason and motivation to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation, when the speaker would otherwise have no reason to fulfill her
expectation, or when it is questionable whether the reasons he does has are sufficient to provide
the recipient with assurance.
Accordingly, what Kolodny and Wallace find most problematic about Scanlon’s
interpretation of a promise is that it cannot explain how a promise provides assurance in certain
paradigm cases, where a promise serves this vital function. The paradigm cases Kolodny and
Wallace have in mind are characterized by two conditions. First, the recipient stands much to
loose if the speaker does not fulfill her expectation, which entails that the speaker’s having a
mere intention will not suffice to provide the recipient with assurance, and the speaker must have
some compelling reason to fulfill the expectation—some prior or nonmoral practice based reason
for adhering to his intention. And the second condition is that the speaker has no prior or
nonmoral practice based reason to fulfill the expectation. To give an example, Kolodny and
Wallace present the following paradigm case, which I’ll call Hume’s Farmers Case:39 “Farmer
A wishes to persuade farmer B to help with A's harvest today in return for A's helping with B's
harvest tomorrow, but is unable to do so, because B is aware that A will have no reason to help
him tomorrow, after having already reaped whatever benefits are coming to him from their
agreement.”40 What we’d like to say in this case is that A can provide B with assurance that he’ll
return B’s help, and can do so by promising. However, as Kolodny and Wallace have argued, on
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Scanlon’s account a promise can only provide a recipient with assurance if the speaker has a
prior or nonmoral practice based reason to stick with his intention and fulfill the recipient’s
expectation, and in this case the speaker does not have a prior or nonmoral practice-based
reason.41 As a result, in a certain paradigm cases of promising, such as Hume’s Farmers Case,
Scanlon’s account cannot explain how a promise can provide assurance.
3.3. Elinor Mason
Elinor Mason formulates the last critique I’ll present, which also shows that a promise as
Scanlon interprets it fails to adequately provide a recipient with assurance. Mason’s critique
does so, however, by arguing that Scanlon fails to capture what is distinctive about the act of
making a promise. She first points out that the difficulty for any account of promissory
obligation is to account for the obligation one acquires in making a promise: “Promising is a
way of incurring an extra obligation—so that if you break a promise you have done (at least) two
things wrong: you have not only misled someone, or upset them, but you have broken your
promise.”42 What is distinctive about making a promise, then, is that one not only convinces the
recipient of an intention to act a certain way, but one also incurs an obligation to fulfill her
expectation, so that in failing to fulfill the recipient’s expectation one not only misleads the
promisee but also breaks his obligation to keep the promise.
Mason’s main criticism of Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise, then, is that it fails to
capture this distinctive feature of making a promise. She points out that promising on Scanlon’s
interpretation seems to simply be a way for the speaker to get the recipient to trust him that he
has a settled intention which will fulfill her expectation, but does nothing to really show that the
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speaker also incurs a moral obligation to fulfill that expectation.43, 44 Since making a promise
does not incur this distinctive obligation, there is thus no account of the extra wrong involved in
breaking a the promise. Moreover, it’s not clear whether the recipient can think that if the
speaker were to revise his intention in the face of some compelling or appealing reason that he
would take himself to have not only misled her, but to also have contravened an obligation to
fulfill her expectation; that is, there is nothing to capture the idea that the speaker would be
breaking his promise.45
Since making a promise does not incur an obligation to fulfill the recipient’s expectation,
but only emphasizes the speaker’s commitment to his intention, we can further conclude that a
promise on Scanlon’s interpretation cannot provide assurance. The recipient may be able to trust
the speaker for various reasons, and be reasonably sure he has an intention that will fulfill her
expectation because she, say, thinks the promisor is a nice guy. However, she cannot be sure the
speaker will adhere to his intention and fulfill her expectation on the basis of the promise.46 That
is, since in making the promise the speaker does not incur an obligation to fulfill her expectation,
its not clear if he takes it to be wrong to fail to fulfill his promise. As such, while the recipient
might feel she can trust the speaker wouldn’t mislead her, since Scanlon’s interpretation doesn’t
account for how the speaker acquires an obligation to fulfill her expectation in the act of making
the promise, it’s not clear that the promise enables her to be reasonably certain that her
expectation will be fulfilled.
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3.4. The Wrong Kind of Assurance
Each of these authors’ critiques is distinct in what they take to be particularly problematic
with Scanlon’s interpretation, but they all converge on the conclusion that how a promise
provides assurance is inadequate. What seems good about Scanlon’s interpretation is that a
promise gives the recipient good reason to think that the speaker has a settled intention to act in a
certain way. What is problematic, however, is that there is not good reason for the recipient to
think that the speaker will adhere to that intention, and fulfill her expectation, unless she
consents to it not being fulfilled. On Michael Pratt’s critique, in making a promise the speaker
does not seem to incur an obligation to the recipient to stick with his intention, and so she has no
reason to think that the speaker will not change his intention without her consent. Similarly, on
Kolodny and Wallace’s critique, a promise does not supply a speaker with a reason and
motivation to fulfill the recipient’s expectation, so that in certain paradigm cases of promising,
where the speaker has no reason to meet the recipient’s expectation, a promise will be ineffective
in giving the recipient good reason to think that her expectation will be fulfilled. And again, on
Elinor Mason’s critique, in making a promise the promisor does not incur any obligation, so that
the recipient cannot be sure on the basis of the promise that that the promisor will fulfill her
expectation. In essence, a promise on Scanlon’s interpretation seems to provide the wrong kind
of assurance: while the recipient can be assured that the speaker has a current settled intention to
act in a certain way, a promise does not enable her to be reasonably certain that her expectation
will be fulfilled unless she consents to it not being fulfilled.
4. Providing Assurance on Scanlon’s Account of Promises
Since a promise on Scanlon’s proposed interpretation cannot actually provide a recipient
with assurance, the account Scanlon advances is problematic. For, the reason a promisor is
18

obligated to fulfill the recipient’s expectation, is because promises provide a recipient with
assurance. Thus, unless there is a way to explain how promises can provide assurance, Scanlon’s
theory will not work as an account of why we are morally obligated to keep our promises. To be
sure, Scanlon’s critics argue that without a social practice or conventional norm, which
establishes an obligation for the promisor, Scanlon’s account is incapable of explaining
promissory obligation.47 However, I am going to argue that, properly revised, Scanlon’s account
can be defended without making such an appeal. Specifically, I will argue that if we take into
consideration the promisor’s moral regard for the recipient’s expectation, then a promise can
provide a recipient with the appropriate assurance.
I’ll begin with the following thought: In making a promise, the speaker conveys his
awareness that it would be morally wrong to lead another to have a certain expectation without
forming the intention to fulfill that expectation. The expectation, we can assume, is one that the
recipient has considerable reasons to want fulfilled, where these are also reasons for valuing
assurance. We can assume, in other words, that the recipient has considerable reasons to want her
expectation actually fulfilled. When another has intentionally led us to form a certain
expectation, then, which we have these considerable reasons to want fulfilled, and when the
person who led us to form that expectation is aware that we have these considerable reasons, we
think the person ought to form the intention to fulfill that expectation, and that it would be wrong
not to do so. Accordingly, the moral wrong that a speaker conveys his awareness of in making a
promise is the wrong of not forming the intention to fulfill an expectation that he has led the
recipient to form, and which he knows the recipient has these strong reasons to want fulfilled.
Now, not only will the promisor convey that he is aware not forming the relevant
47
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intention is morally wrong, but he will also convey that he is moved to actually form that
intention. To see this we can consider briefly Scanlon’s account of moral motivation. What
guides our thinking about which actions are morally right and wrong, on Scanlon’s view, is
consideration of what can be justified to others on grounds they cannot reasonably reject. And,
the value we place on acting in accordance with principles determined by such considerations
moves us to act morally. Scanlon writes, “When I reflect on the reason that the wrongness of an
action seems to supply not to do it, the best description of this reason I can come up with has to
do with the relation to others that such acts would put me in: the sense that others could
reasonably object to what I do.”48 The fact that an action is morally wrong, that is to say, moves
us to avoid its performance because acting in that way would be unjustifiable: others who were
concerned to live on mutually justifiable terms could reasonably reject any principle that
permitted our performing that action. In essence, what both guides our thinking about right and
wrong, and moves us to govern our practical thought and conduct accordingly, is the ideal of
justifiability—the ideal of acting in ways that others, concerned to live in accordance with
mutually justifiable principles, could not reasonably object to.
Accordingly, we can infer that the speaker is moved to form the intention to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation as follows. Since the speaker is aware that in the current situation not
forming the relevant intention is morally wrong, he can also be said to understand that not
forming the relevant intention is unjustifiable—that given the considerable reasons the recipient
has for wanting the expectation to be fulfilled, and the fact that he is responsible for her having
that expectation, not forming the intention to fulfill the expectation is something that others who
were concerned to live on mutually justifiable terms could reasonably object to. What guides our
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thinking about right or wrong, that is to say, is consideration of what can be justified to others on
grounds they cannot reasonably reject. As such, if the speaker conveys to the recipient that he is
aware that not forming the relevant intention would be morally wrong, then what he conveys is
his understanding that, given the circumstances, not forming the relevant intention cannot be
justified to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.
Now if the speaker conveys this understanding, then what he reveals, and allows the
recipient to infer, is that he is concerned to act in ways that are justifiable.49 Specifically, to
understand that a particular action is morally wrong is to consider what others concerned to live
on mutually justifiable terms could reasonably object to. Since the speaker conveys his
understanding that, under the circumstances, not forming the intention to fulfill her expectation is
morally wrong, he can be said to convey to the recipient that consideration of what others can
reasonably object to is something that guides his deliberation of how he ought to act—that is, he
conveys that he is concerned with, or places value on, acting in ways that are justifiable.
If the speaker has a concern to act in ways that are justifiable, then the recipient can
further infer that the speaker will be moved to form the intention to fulfill her expectation. For
not being so moved would be unjustifiable—it would be something others could reasonably
object to, given the considerable reasons the recipient has for wanting the expectation to be
fulfilled, and given the fact that he led her to have that expectation. More precisely, if the
speaker conveys a concern that his actions be justifiable, then what he conveys is not only that
consideration of what can be justified to others guides his thinking of how he ought to act, but
that he is also moved to act accordingly; for it he were not so moved then his actions would be
unjustifiable—something he is concerned to avoid. Therefore, in making a promise the speaker
49
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not only conveys his awareness that it would be morally wrong not to form the intention to fulfill
the recipient’s expectation, but he also conveys that he is moved to actually form that intention.
Now, perhaps this is all well and good; but what reason is there to think that the speaker
will adhere to his intention? On the interpretation I’ve provided, we can say the speaker
acquires a stable reason and motivation for that intention. For rather than depending on a
particular aim or desire that he just so happens to have at the time of making the promise, the
speaker’s reason and motivation instead derives from his moral concern that his actions be
justifiable to others on grounds they cannot reasonably reject.50 Specifically, the reason and
motivation the speaker has for forming this intention are supplied by his concern to act in ways
that are justifiable, and then from the fact that not forming this intention would be unjustifiable.
Of course, one might want to say that the speaker’s concern that his actions are justifiable to
others is a kind of goal or aim. The point being made here, however, is that this kind of concern
is far more secure: that one’s concern to act morally is not subject to change in the way that a
particular course of conduct he would like to pursue might be, or in the way some desire he
would like to fulfill is. Furthermore, reasons that derive out of one’s concern to act morally
have a distinctive normative force. In Scanlon’s terms, such considerations have a certain
priority in that they provide us reasons that take precedence over other considerations; and they
also have a distinctive importance in that it is especially important or serious that we act on those
considerations.51 So, since the reason and motivation the speaker has for his intention to fulfill
the recipient’s expectation derives from this general moral concern, and so have this distinct kind
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of normativity, they will be far more stable than some other particular aim or desire that he just
happens to have at the time of making the promise.
Not only will the speaker’s reason and motivation have this distinctive normative force,
however, but we can also notice that there is a further, more pertinent sense in which the
speaker’s reason and motivation for his intention to fulfill the recipient’s expectation is secure
and not subject to change. Specifically, this reason and motivation are stable, and the
corresponding intention settled, because the only way for the speaker to lose this reason and
motivation is if the recipient consents to the expectation not being fulfilled. Even if the speaker
were to encounter some other, more appealing course of action, or were to find himself as having
no desire to do what the recipient is expecting, it will nonetheless still be the case that the
recipient has that expectation; and given the strong reasons she has for wanting it to be fulfilled,
and the fact that the speaker led her to have the expectation, not retaining his intention would be
unjustifiable. Since the speaker is concerned to act in ways that are justifiable, the recipient can
infer that the speaker will adhere to his intention to fulfill her expectation.52
To illustrate the argument thus far, let me present an example. Stacy is a co-worker with
Justin, and she asks Justin if he’d be willing to pick her daughter up from daycare tomorrow.
Justin agrees; but remembering that he often goes fishing with his friends after work, Stacy asks
if Justin will promise to pick up her daughter. Justin responds by saying, “I promise.” In
promising, Justin conveys his understanding that it would be morally wrong to lead Stacy to
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expect that he will pick up her daughter tomorrow without actually forming the intention to
fulfill that expectation, and this provides Stacy with the understanding that Justin is concerned to
act in ways that are justifiable. What this allows Stacy to infer is that Justin will not only form
the relevant intention, but that he will also be moved to adhere to that intention. For instance, we
can imagine what would happen if Justin’s friends were to invite him fishing when he is
supposed to pick up Stacy’s daughter. In such a case, even though he will be tempted, not
adhering the intention to fulfill Stacy’s expectation, and going fishing instead, is something that
Stacy and others could reasonably object to, and since Justin is concerned with acting in ways
that others could not reasonably object to, Stacy can infer that he will be moved to retain his
intention to meet her expectation.
We can now see how a promise can provide assurance on Scanlon’s account. For not
only can the recipient be reasonably certain that the speaker will adhere to his intention to fulfill
her expectation, but she can be reasonably certain that he will fulfill her expectation unless she
consents to it not being fulfilled. As we’ve seen, the reason and motivation the speaker has for,
not only forming the relevant intention, but also for adhering to that intention, derives from his
concern to act in ways that are justifiable to others. Thus, the only way for the speaker to loose
the reason and motivation for this intention is if not adhering to his intention would be
justifiable—that is, would be something he could justify to others on grounds they could not
reasonably reject. The only way not adhering to his intention would justifiable, however, is if he
either encountered an extenuating circumstance, where he has a either a reasonable excuse or a
reasonable justification for not fulfilling the recipient’s expectation, or if the recipient consented
to her expectation not being fulfilled—if the recipient permitted the speaker to not fulfill her
expectation then he could justify not adhering to his intention on grounds that others could not

24

reasonably reject. Thus, even if the speaker encountered some other, more appealing course of
action, or found himself having no desire to fulfill her expectation, the recipient can be
reasonably certain that he will nonetheless be moved to adhere to his intention, or to consult her
to see if she would consent to his not fulfilling her expectation. In making a promise, therefore,
the speaker provides the recipient with assurance—the promise enables her to be reasonably
certain that her expectation will be fulfilled unless she consents to it not being fulfilled.53
Noting how it addresses the worry with Scanlon’s interpretation can perhaps clarify the
way that a promise provides assurance on my interpretation. The way a promise provides
assurance on Scanlon’s interpretation was thought to be problematic because it only enables the
recipient to be assured that, currently, the speaker has a settled intention that will fulfill her
expectation, which does not actually provide assurance—that is, a promise on Scanlon’s
interpretation does not enable the recipient to be reasonably certain that her expectation will be
fulfilled, unless she consents to it not being fulfilled. On the interpretation I have provided,
however, a promise can provide this assurance. For unlike a particular aim he would like to
pursue, or a particular desire he would like fulfilled, the promisor’s reason and motivation for his
intention to fulfill the recipient’s expectation is not under his own direct control in the same way.
In particular, the promisee is partly determinative of how it is justifiable for the promisor to
conduct himself; and thus, since the promisor is concerned to act in ways that are justifiable, the
promisor’s reason and motivation are to an appropriate and relevant extent under promisee’s
control. Specifically, unless the he encounters some extenuating circumstance, the only way for
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the promisor to loose his reason and motivation for his intention to fulfill the promisee’s
expectation is through her, that is, by consulting with her to see if she will consent to his not
fulfilling her expectation. In this way, not only can the recipient of a promise be assured that the
speaker has a settled intention to fulfill her expectation, but she can be reasonably certain that the
speaker will actually fulfill that expectation unless she consents to it not being fulfilled—and the
speaker’s promise will therefore have provided the recipient with the appropriate assurance.
If the arguments I’ve presented are sound, then a promise can provide assurance on
Scanlon’s account, and does so without depending on a social practice or conventional norm or
agreement making. Specifically, what provides the recipient with assurance, on the
interpretation I have given, is the speaker’s awareness of a moral wrong, where this moral wrong
does not derive from or depend on any social practice or conventional norm of agreement
making. Of course, the recipient may come to understand what the promisor means when he
says, “I promise,” in virtue of certain conventions we have. However, the reason the promise
provides her with assurance is due to the speaker’s awareness and understanding of a moral
wrong that derives, not from the existence of any social practice or conventional norm, but from
the speaker’s leading the recipient to form an expectation that she has considerable reasons to
want fulfilled.
5. Addressing Pratt, Kolodny & Wallace, and Mason
I’ve already noted how this interpretation addresses the general problem that Michael
Pratt, Niko Kolodny, R. Jay Wallace, and Elinor Mason all find with Scanlon’s interpretation of
a promise. Before concluding, however, I will explain how my interpretation of a promise
addresses these authors’ more specific concerns.
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5.1. Michael Pratt
Pratt argues that if a promise is to provide the appropriate assurance, the recipient must
have the understanding that the speaker will adhere to his intention, or that he will perform the
expected act unless she consents to his not performing the act. And the only plausible way the
recipient can have this understanding, Pratt claims, is if a promise conveys that the promisor
regards himself as morally owing it to the recipient to adhere to his intention to fulfill her
expectation. While I have not made any explicit reference or use of the idea that a promisor
conveys that he regards himself as morally owing something to the recipient, I will argue that the
interpretation I’ve provided can capture much of what is meant by this idea.54
There seem to be two ideas that we think a promisor must have in mind in regarding
himself as morally owing it to the promisee to fulfill her expectation. First, that if he fails to
fulfill the promisee’s expectation, he does something wrong to the promisee. And second, that
the promisee has a certain kind of limited authority over the promisor’s conduct, where barring
extenuating circumstances the promisor is required to act so as to fulfill the recipient’s
expectation, and may be released from this requirement only if the promisee agrees to it.55
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The interpretation I’ve provided can account for both of these ideas. First, if the
promisor failed to fulfill the promisee’s expectation he would regard himself as having done
something wrong to the promisee, because he would regard himself as having placed an
unjustifiable burden on her. That is, given the strong reasons the promisee has for wanting the
expectation to be fulfilled, the promisor will regard not forming the intention to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation to mean placing a considerable amount of trouble on the promisee. And
given the fact that it was he who led her to form the expectation, he will further take it to mean
that he would be placing that trouble on her. Thus, the promisor will regard not fulfilling the
promisee’s expectation as wronging the promisee.
Second, the promisor will regard the promisee as having a certain authority over his
conduct, because he will regard her as partly determinative of how it is justifiable for him to act.
As we’ve noted, the source of the promisor’s reason and motivation for his intention to full the
recipient’s expectation stem from his moral regard for the kind of expectation she has—an
expectation she has considerable reasons to want fulfilled, and that he led her to form. Barring
extenuating circumstances, then, the only way for the speaker to lose his reason and motivation
is if the recipient consents to his not fulfilling her expectation. Hence, the promisor’s reason and
motivation are to an appropriate and relevant extent under promisee’s control, and the promisor
will thereby regard the promisee as standing in a certain authoritative relation to him.
In essence, since it is out of his moral regard for the promisee’s expectation that the
promisor forms and adheres to his intention to fulfill that expectation, and since he regards the
promisee as having a certain authority over how it is justifiable for him to act, we can say the
promisor regards himself as morally owing it to the recipient to form and stick to the intention to
fulfill her expectation.
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5.2. Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace
The main problem that Kolodny and Wallace find with Scanlon’s interpretation is that it
seems like a promise cannot perform the unique function of providing the promisor with a reason
and motivation to fulfill the promisee’s expectation regardless of whatever other reasons he may
or may not have toward this end. And as a consequence, a promise will not be able to provide a
recipient with assurance in certain paradigm cases of promising epitomized by Hume’s Farmers
Case. To refresh our memory, in this scenario Farmer A wants farmer B to help with A's harvest
today in return for A's helping with B's harvest tomorrow. However, farmer B stands a lot to
loose if Farmer A doesn’t follow through, and B is aware that A will have no reason to help him
tomorrow after having already reaped whatever benefits are coming to him from their agreement.
What we would like to say is that A can provide B with assurance by promising, but Scanlon’s
interpretation, Kolodny and Wallace argue, is unable to explain how a promise can do so.
The interpretation I’ve provided, however, can aptly explain how a promise can provide
assurance in Hume’s Farmers Case. In promising, farmer A conveys his understanding that it
would be morally wrong to lead farmer B to expect that he will help him with his crops
tomorrow without actually forming the intention to fulfill that expectation, and this provides B
with the understanding that A is concerned to act in ways that are justifiable. What this allows B
to infer is that A will not only form the relevant intention, but that he will also be moved to
adhere to that intention. For instance, we can imagine that tomorrow A find’s himself as not
having a desire to work, but instead preferring to watch the football game on TV. In such a case,
even though he will be tempted, not adhering the intention to fulfill farmer B’s expectation, and
watching the football game instead, would be unjustifiable, and since A is concerned with acting
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in ways that are not unjustifiable, we can infer that he will be moved to retain his intention to
meet farmer B’s expectation, and help him with his crops.
Thus, a promise on the interpretation I’ve provided can perform the vital function of
supplying the promisor with a reason and motivation to fulfill the promisee’s expectation
regardless of whatever other reasons he may or may not have toward this end. For a promise to
provide assurance, the speaker does not need to have any prior reasons or motivations. So long
as he has a moral concern with acting in ways that are justifiable to others, in making a promise
the speaker will acquire a stable reason and motivation for forming the intention to fulfill the
recipient’s expectation, and will be moved to adhere to that intention, even if doing so conflicts
with some of his other personal aims or desires.
5.3. Elinor Mason
Mason points out that on Scanlon’s interpretation of a promise the speaker seems to only
be emphasizing a commitment to act a certain way, which leaves unexplained what is distinct
about making a promise. Specifically, Scanlon’s interpretation fails to account for the fact that
when someone makes a promise he does not just convince the recipient of an intention to act a
certain way, but also acquires an obligation to fulfill the recipient’s expectation, so that if one
breaks a promise he has not only misled the recipient but also committed the further wrong of
breaking the promise. Thus, Mason criticizes Scanlon’s interpretation by claiming that it does
not account for how a speaker acquires this extra obligation in making a promise, and so does not
account of the extra wrong involved in breaking the promise.
On the interpretation I’ve provided, the speaker does not simply convince the recipient of
an intention to act a certain way, but he also incurs an obligation to form the intention to fulfill
the recipient’s expectation. In making a promise, this is to say, the speaker is not conveying an
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understanding of the wrong involved in intentionally manipulating the recipient to have a false
expectation. Rather, he is conveying his understanding that, given the nature of the recipient’s
expectation, not to form the intention to fulfill that expectation would be unjustifiable. Thus, in
making a promise the speaker does not just convey that he wouldn’t commit a certain wrong of
manipulation, but is conveying his awareness that, given the circumstances, he is under a moral
obligation to form the intention to fulfill her expectation—or to fulfill the promise.
Accordingly, the wrong that the speaker conveys his understanding of in making a
promise is not just the wrong of misleading the recipient, but is the wrong of not forming the
intention to fulfill a certain kind of expectation. That is, the promisor is led to form the relevant
intention not because he would otherwise be intentionally misleading the recipient, or because
the recipient has good reasons to not want to be deceived or lied to. Instead, the speaker forms
the intention out of a moral regard for the kind of expectation the recipient has. Thus, in
breaking a promise the speaker will not simply regard himself as having committed the wrong
involved in misleading someone, but will regard himself as having committed the wrong of not
forming or adhering to the intention to fulfill a certain kind of expectation—viz. an expectation
that he led the recipient to have, and which the recipient has considerable reasons to want
actually fulfilled.
6. Conclusion
While a social practice or convention may play some role in how we make promises,
Scanlon argues that a social practice or conventional norm of agreement making plays no
essential role in explaining why we have an obligation to keep our promises, and why it is wrong
to break a promise. On Scanlon’s view, promises provide assurance, and given the considerable
reasons we have for valuing that assurance, we have a moral obligation to keep our promises.
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The kind of theory that Scanlon advances, however, is often thought to be untenable—such
accounts are thought inadequate to explain how a promise can create in the recipient an
expectation that it would be morally wrong not to fulfill without falling into a vicious circularity.
Though Scanlon attempts to address this charge, Michael Pratt, Niko Kolodny, R. Jay Wallace,
and Elinor Mason all argue that a promise cannot provide a recipient with the appropriate kind of
assurance without appealing to some social practice or conventional norm. If the arguments I
have presented are sound, however, and a promise can provide assurance without making such
an appeal, then Scanlon’s account can escape this common charge or circularity, and is a
perfectly tenable theory of why we have an obligation to keep our promises.

32

Bibliography
Anscombe, G.E.M. “Rules, Rights, and Promises,” in Ethics, Religion, and Politics: Collected
Philosophical Papers, 97-103. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by D. Norton & M. Norton. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Mason, Elinor. “We Make No Promises.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol 123, No. ½ (2003): 33-46.
Parkhill, Richard. “Assurance and Scanlon’s Theory of Promises,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society Vol CVIII, Part 3 (2008): 385-392.
Patterson, Dennis. “The Value of a Promise,” Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy Vol. 11, No. 4 (1992): 385-402.
Pratt, Michael. “Promises and Perlocutions.” Critical Review of International Social and
Political Philosophy Vol. 5, No. 2 (2002): 93-119.
Pratt, Michael. “Scanlon on Promising.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. 14,
No. 1 (January 2001): 143-154.
Prichard, H.A. “The Obligation to Keep a Promise,” in Moral Writings, edited by Jim MacAdam,
257–266. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Robbins, Michael. “The Primacy of Promising.” Mind Vol. 85, No. 339 (1976): 321-340.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Raz, Joseph. “Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society Supplement, Vol. 46 (1972): 79-102.
Scanlon, Thomas. “Promises and Contracts.” In The Theory of Contract Law, edited by Peter
Benson, 86-117. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1998.
Southwood, Nicholas and Daniel Friedrich. “Promises Beyond Assurance,” Philosophical
Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 144, No.
2 (2009): 261-280.

33

Tognazzini, Neal A. “The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation.” Philosophy & Public
Affairs Vol. 35, No. 3 (2007): 203-232.
Wallace, R. Jay, and Niko Kolodny. Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 31, No. 2 (2003): 119154.

34

